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The segregation states may be able to bring negro schools up to a substantial equality with white schools in point of physical facilities, but
the "intangibles" will defeat them.

J. L.

HET INGER.

CLARIFICATION OF THE REGIONAL GRAZIERs DUTIES UNDER
THE ]EDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT

The plaintiff was the lessee of certain property which lies adjacent to
government land which is part of a grazing area supervised under the Taylor Grazing Act. The owner or lessor of such adjoining property called
"base property"' is entitled in the normal course of administration of the
Taylor Grazing Act to a grazing permit upon the government land adjoining the leased or owned land. The base property in this case had
previously been leased to another party who had been issued a grazing
permit. Upon the leasing of the land by the plaintiff, the Federal Grazier
refused to cancel the outstanding permit to the plaintiff's predecessor, thus
allowing the predecessor to remain in possession of the government land
under color of right. Action was brought under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. It was alleged that the government employee wrongfully permitted,
aided, and directed the plaintiff's predecessor to use the land, and that
the government employee wrongfully refused to cancel the outstanding
permit. As a result the plaintiff was forced to buy additional feed for his
livestock and was damaged in the amount of $109,000.00. District Court
sustained the defendant's motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff appealed.
Held, that the complaint stated a cause of action. The judgment of the
District Court was reversed and remanded. Oman v. United States, 179 F.
(2d) 738 (10th Cir. 1949).
In 1946 a further inroad upon the Federal Government's immunity to
suit was brought about by the Federal Tort Claims Act. 2 This Act granted
the United States District Courts exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on
claims against the United States for the negligent or wrongful acts of the
Government's employees while acting within the scope of their office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable. 3 This broad waiver of immunity was limited by
1.
2.
3

Base property is defined as "property used for support of livestock for which a
grazing privilege is sought and on the basis of which the extent of a license or
permit is computed." 43 C.F.R. 1612 (e).
28 U.S.C.A. secs. 1346(b), 2671-2680; 43 U.S.C.A. secs. 314-315q.
"Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title the District Courts ...
shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States for
money damages, accruing on or after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property,
or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission
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several exceptions, 4 one of which is as follows: "The provisions of this
chapter and section 1346 (b) shall not apply to: (a) any claim based upon
an act or omission to act of an employee of the Government exercising due
care in the execution of a statute or regulation whether or not such statute
or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government whether or
not the discretion be abused." 5 The immunity here retained is consistent
with principles of non-liability of municipalities for acts of their servants
which involve the exercise of this discretion. 6 The criteria for distinguishing a ministerial function from a discretionary function remain
(as far as can be ascertained) those used in other contexts. 7 A duty
is ministerial when "it is absolute, certain and imperative, involving
merely the execution of a set task, and when the law which imposes it
prescribes the time, mode and occasion of its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or discretion."
The duties of
Government employees engaged in administering the federal grazing lands
here involved are determined by the Federal Range Code for Grazing
Districts. 9 The cause of action is based upon the Grazier's refusal to cancel
an old permit after notification that the controlling base property had been
transferred. The pertinent section of the Code reads as follows: "A transferee of base property whether by agreement or operation of law, or testamentary disposition will entitle the transferee, if otherwise properly
qualified, to all or such part of a license or permit as is based on the property
transferred, and the original license or permit will be terminated or decreased by such transfer."' 10 A further provision states that licenses or
permits which confer grazing privileges in excess of those properly allowable
"will be cancelled" if cause be not shown why they should not be cancelled."'
Cancellation is clearly a ministerial function and does not fall within the
2
exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act.'
The Regional Grazier's failure to act has allowed a situation to materialize which interferred with the rights of the preference holder to his
damage. In order to determine what rights accure to a preference holder
of any employee of the government while acting within the scope of his office .or
employment, under the circumstances where the United States, if a private person
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C.A. sec. 1346-2 (b).
4. 28 U.S.C.A. sec. 2680.
5. 28 U.S.C.A. sec. 2860.
6 Harris v. District of Columbia, 256 U.S. 650, 41 S.Ct. 610, 65 L. Ed. 1146 (1921).
7. Roberts v. United States, 176 U.S. 221, 20 S.Ct. 376, 44 L. Ed. 443 (1900). Federal
Tort Claims Act, 56 Yale Law Journal 534 (1947).
8. Rehmann v Des Moines, 204 Iowa 798, 215 N.W. 957, 55 A.L.R. 430 (1927).
9. The Federal Range Code for Grazing Districts 43 C.F.R. 161.
10. 43 C.F.R. 161.7 (a).
11. In case of failure . . . to show cause . . .the license or permit will be cancelled to
the extent indicated in the notice." 43 C.F.R. 161.9(d).
12. It should be noticed that the issuance of permits by the Grazier is called discretionary. 43 C.F.R. 161.9(c). It would fall within the exception of the Federal Tort
Claims Act previously mentioned. For an abuse of this discretionary power the
permit seeker is offered procedural protection by the same section.
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the legal history of preferences must be reviewed.
Early in the history of this country large areas of unappropriated
government lands were freely used by stockmen. The Government condoned
this practice and in fact recognized such use as creating an implied
license. 13 Although some rights were recognized between individuals,
the licenses could be revoked at any time by the Government. 14 These
licenses are the historical forerunners of the permits now issued under
the Taylor Grazing Act. The rights appurtenant to these permits are still
being determined. In Osborne v. United States1 5 the court recognized that
the terms of a permit are binding as between the Government and the
permit holder and other permit seekers. In Red Canyon Sheep Company
v. Ickes16 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
recognized that the preferences upon which permits are granted are the
proper subjects of equitable protection. These preferences, it was said,
did not fall within the classification of conventional grazing or Vested rights,
but as they had as their source an act of Congress and are of definite value
to the persons possessing them, the court felt that they should be protected.1 7
To determine whether a cause of action is stated it is still necessary to decide
whether or not the Grazier acted within the scope of his employment.
The phrase, scope of employment, has been called a "highly indefinite
phrase" and "no more than a bare formula to cover the uncommanded acts
of the servant for which it is found to be expedient to charge the master
with liability."18 A more definite test states that if the acts of the agent
may fairly and reasonably be incidental to the purposes of the employment
or the natural, direct, or logical result of the purposes for which the agent
was employed, the agent may then be within the scope of employment.1 9
The fact that the act was expressly forbidden does not preclude the liability
of the principal though it may be an important fact in determining the
"liability.20 The scope of the employment is a question of fact and, as the
Court of Appeals pointed out, should be decided after a full hearing of the
facts.
The avowed purpose of the Federal Range Code for Grazing Districts
to define the stockgrowers' rights, to protect those rights by regulation
13.

14.
15.
16.
17.

18.
19.
20.

Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 10 S.Ct. 305, 33 L. Ed. 618 (1890); Light v. United
States, 220 U.S. 523, 535; 31 S.Ct. 485, 487; 55 L. Ed. 570 (1911); Steele v. United
States 113 U.S. 128, 130; 5 S.Ct. 396, 28 L.Ed. 952 (1865); Omaechevarria v. Idaho
246 U.S. 343, 352; 38 S.Ct. 323, 327; 62 L. Ed 763 (1918).
Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 10 S.Ct. 305, 33 L.Ed. 618 (1890).
145 F.(2d) 892 (9th Cir. 1944).
98 F. (2d) 308 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
"We rule that the valuable nature of the privelege to graze which arises in a
licensee whose license will in the ordinary course of administration . . . ripen into
a permit, makes the privilige a proper subject of equitable protection against an
illegal act." Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.(2d) 308, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
Prosser, Torts, 476 (1941).
Mechem Outlines Agency, 3d ed. sec. 531.
Mechem on Agency, 2d ed. Vol. II, sec. 1879. Restatement of Agency, Vol. I, sec. 22.8.
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against interference, 2 1 and to promote the most advantageous use of the
property.2 2 The recognition by the courts of grazing preferences as
property rights, different from conventional rights, but rights which nevertheless may be protected not only by injunction but by legal actions is an
important step toward the fulfillment of the purpose of the Act.
RIcHARD S. DUMBRILL.
21.
22.

United States v. Achabal, 34 F. Supp. 1 (D. Nev. 1940).
122 F.(2d) 791 (9th Cir. 1941).
43 C.F.R. 161.1 (a).

Reversed on other grounds

